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Abstract. This paper1 addresses the problem of assessing the veridicity
of textual content. Has an event mentioned in the text really occurred?
Who is the source of the information? What is the stance of the author
of the text? Does the author indicate whether he believes the source?
We will survey some of linguistic conventions that indicate the author’s
commitment, or the lack thereof, to the propositions contained in her
text. In particular we discuss phenomena that have been studied as pre-
suppositions or conventional implicatures in previous literature. Some of
those, such as factive and non-factive verbs, have received extensive at-
tention in the past. Some others, such as supplemental expressions (e.g.
appositives, parentheticals), have not received much previous attention,
although they are very common and a rich source of textual inferences.
A recent study by Christopher Potts classifies supplemental expressions
as conventional implicatures. We agree with Potts on the label but not
on what it means. In contrast to Potts, we claim that supplemental ex-
pressions cannot always be treated as the author’s direct commitments
and argue that they do not constitute a basis for a distinction between
presuppositions and conventional implicatures. We illustrate some cases
of conventional implicature and show how they indicate an author’s com-
mitment to the truth of his statements and briefly state the importance
of these distinctions for Information Extraction (IE).
Keywords. veridicity, commitment, entailment, presupposition, con-
ventional implicature, supplemental expression
1 Introduction
When text is exploited for question-answering or other information extraction
tasks, it is important to distinguish between material that corresponds to entities
or situations that exist in the real world and material that doesn’t. Ultimately,
the correspondence of a linguistic object to an object in the real world goes
1 This work was supported in part by the Advanced Research and Development Activ-
ity (ARDA)’s Advanced Question Answering for Intelligence (AQUAINT) Program.
We thank Kenneth R. Beesley and Stanley Peters for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
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beyond what can be learned from the text itself. When somebody says or writes
The earth is flat or The king of France is bald because (s)he is a liar or ill-
informed, nothing in these linguistic expressions in themselves alerts us to the
fact that they do not correspond to situations in the real world. But a text
does give us information about the stance its author takes vis-a`-vis the events or
states described. When somebody says Bill acknowledges that the earth is round,
we know something about the author’s as well as Bill’s beliefs in the matter.
It is thus useful to distinguish between two ingredients that go into deter-
mining the truth value of utterance, one is the trustworthiness of the utterer
and the other is the stance of the utterer vis-a`-vis the truth of the content. The
latter we will call the veridicity of the content and veridicity is the topic of this
paper.
In what follows, we will refer to the person who creates a text (or makes a spo-
ken utterance) as the author. When an author is trustworthy, i.e. well-informed
and honest, veridical assertions are true. But apart from making assertions an
author will often conventionally implicate certain things. These implications are
not considered to be part of what determines the truth value of the sentence,
even when the author is trustworthy. We, however, consider them to be veridical,
and we will say that the author is committed to them. We think it is reason-
able, for IE purposes, to assume that material that is conventionally implicated
can be used together with assertions to provide answers to questions.
We concentrate on how we as readers or hearers assess the facts, events, etc.
related in the text under the hypothesis of a trustworthy author: how authors
signal their commitment (or lack thereof) to the reality of the situations they
report on. In what follows we will survey some linguistic devices that help deter-
mine what an author’s commitments are, i.e. which propositions are veridical.
In the types of text that are used in IE tasks, we will often find that authors
report opinions of others, as in the last example above. We will refer to these
others as the source of the opinion, statement, etc.
2 Conventional Implicature
The term conventional implicature is first found in Grice[1] but, as Kent Bach[2]
points out, the basic idea is due to Gottlob Frege. In his 1918 article The
Thought[3], Frege wrote:
With the sentence ‘Alfred has still not come’ one really says ‘Alfred has
not come’ and, at the same time, hints that his arrival is expected, but
it is only hinted. It cannot be said that, since Alfred’s arrival is not
expected, the sense of the sentence is therefore false.
The crucial distinction, popularized by Grice, is between assertion and
implicature. Strictly speaking, the truth or falsity of a sentence depends on
what is being asserted, not on the truth of the implicature. Grice discusses two
kinds of implicatures: conversational and conventional. Conversational
implicatures arise from principles of social interaction such as cooperativeness.
Veridicity 3
Conventional implicatures arise from individual words such as still, too, even,
and particular syntactic constructions.
Sentences with manage and fail provide good examples of conventional im-
plicatures.
(1) a. Bush managed to read the report.
b. Bush failed to read the report.
(1a) asserts that Bush read the report and suggests/hints that it was in some
way difficult for him to do. (1b) asserts that Bush did not read the report and
suggests that he had an opportunity and tried, or should have tried, to read it.
If we negate the sentences in (1), the assertions switch polarity but the im-
plicatures remain the same:
(2) a. Bush didn’t manage to read the report.
b. Bush didn’t fail to read the report.
Of course, the sentences in (2) could be uttered, with a special intonation,
to explicitly contradict the implicature of the corresponding sentence in (1):
(3) Bush didn’t “fail” to read the report. He never received it.
Example (3) does not claim that Bush read the report, it is a denial of the
suggestion that his not doing so can be characterized as a failure. (3) is a response
provoked by a statement like (1b); it requires a particular discourse situation.
In this respect, conventional implicatures associated with words like fail and
manage are similar to the so-called ‘existential presuppositions’ associated with
definite descriptions such as the present king of France. The pair of sentences in
(4) is not a normal way of saying that France is not a monarchy. In the prior
discourse, someone must have introduced the proposition that the present king
of France is bald.
(4) The present king of France is not bald. There is no king of France.
There is an enormous literature on presuppositions,2 much of it focused on
the technical question of whether the truth value of the first sentence of (4) is
false, undefined, or something else in the case there is no such king. We take
no position on that issue here.
As Karttunen and Peters[5] point out, the phenomena discussed under the
label of presupposition have much in common with conventional implicatures
arising from words such as still, too, even, manage, and fail. They conclude that
presuppositions are best viewed as conventional implicatures. This is a controver-
sial issue. Potts[6] argues that conventional implicatures are not presuppositions,
Bach[2] denies the existence of conventional implicatures altogether. We have a
lot to say on this topic but not in this paper.
Here we limit ourselves to classifying the phenomena that go under the name
’presupposition’ or ’conventional implicatures’ according to the following three
2 For a recent survey, see Beaver[4]
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diagnostics, discussed in Karttunen and Peters (ref). These diagnostics identify
the environments in which the author is or is not committed to the truth of the
content of the the presuppostion/implicature.
– The author is committed to presuppositions and conventional implicatures.
Examples such as (3) and (4) are incoherent except as rejections of another
speaker’s assertion (it could be him/herself in another role or at another
time).3 We do not expect to find such examples in written monologues or
narratives written from a single perspective.
– Interrogative sentences carry the same conventional implicatures/presuppos-
itions as their declarative counterparts. Did Bush manage to read the report?
suggests that it was difficult in some way. Is the king of France bald? makes
sense only on the assumption that France has a king. There might be a
difference between these two cases in that the latter question builds on the
view that the king exists whereas in the case of manage the implicature and
the questioned proposition are parallel, independent of each other.
– Conditional sentences generally seem to inherit the conventional implica-
tures of the consequent. For example, If the report is correct, Nixon is guilty
too suggests that there is some guilty person other than Nixon. However, in
a case such as If Haldeman is guilty, Nixon is guilty too, the antecedent pro-
vides another guilty person and the conditional as a whole seems not inherit
the implicature of the consequent.4 Definite descriptions behave similarly. If
France has a king, the king of France lives in the Elyse´e Palace. does not
‘presuppose’ the existence of a king.
3 Supplemental Expressions
The term supplemental expressions, introduced by Huddleston and Pullum[8],
includes a variety of constructions that have not attracted much attention lately,
although they are very common and a rich source of textual inferences. They
include as-clauses, non-restrictive relative clauses, nominal apposi-
tives, parenthetical adverbs, and epithets.
Some examples, mostly from Potts[6], are given in (5).
(5) a. Ames was, as the press reported, a successful spy.
b. Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.
c. Lance Armstrong, an Arkansan, has won the 2002 Tour de France.
d. Luckily, Beck survived the descent.
3 Karttunen and Peters define a special contradiction negation operator for such
cases that scopes over the conjunction of the assertion and the implicature.
4 For further discussion, see Karttunen[7] and Karttunen and Peters[5]. In their sys-
tem, the conventional implicatures of the consequent clause are inherited as condi-
tional propositions by the conditional sentence: If Haldeman is guilty, then someone
other than Nixon is guilty. The effect in this case is that the implicature becomes
vacuous.
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e. The heiress married Bill and the lucky man became a millionaire.
As Potts points out, these constructions clearly give rise to conventional
implicatures. For example, (5c) commits the author to the mistaken opinion
that Lance Armstrong is an Arkansan. But the assertion in the main clause is
nevertheless true.
Potts develops a logic that separates the truth-conditional aspect of meaning
from conventional implicatures. As Potts himself points out, the basic idea is
similar to the two-dimensional semantics of Karttunen and Peters[5], inspired
by Herzberger [9]. In Potts’s logic, conventional implicatures that arise in an
embedded clause are always present in the resulting semantic tree and represent
the author’s commitments. Potts believes that the phenomena he is focusing on
are fundamentally different from the cases treated by Karttunen and Peters. We
believe that this view is not correct and will briefly explain the reasons.
Consider the example (5e). It commits the author to the view that Bill is
a lucky man. But the corresponding conditional in (6) does not carry the same
commitment. The characterization of Bill as the lucky man in (6) can be condi-
tional on whether the heiress really married him.
(6) If the heiress married Bill, the lucky man became a millionaire.
The same point can be made with respect to appositives. The example in (7a)
does not commit the author to the view that Lance Armstrong is a Frenchman
but (7b) does.
(7) a. If Lance takes up French citizenship, as a Frenchman he will win the
Tour easily.
b. If Lance decides to participate, as a Frenchman he will win the Tour
easily.
As in the Nixon examples above, the antecedent has an effect on what the
conditional as a whole conventionally implicates.
Similar examples are more difficult to construct for other types of supple-
mental expressions Potts discusses. Nominal appositives (8) and non-restrictive
relative clauses (9) seem to be rather resistant to cancellation as the following
examples show.
(8) If Rader really is the BTK killer, then the murder of Miss Davis, Rader’s
last victim, has finally been solved.
(9) If the charges against him are true, Hanssen, who sold FBI secrets to the
Russians, could face the death penalty.
There are of course many other linguistic means besides the if-clause to in-
troduce a hypothetical context. The author of (10) is not committed to the
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appositive a third time offender if Gonzales is found not guilty. But he is com-
mitted to Gonzales having been convicted at least twice before.5
(10) The jury is very likely to convict Gonzales. In that case, as a third time
offender, he will never get out of jail.
In summary, we agree with Potts that supplemental expressions give rise to
conventional implicatures but we observe that their interpretation as speaker
commitments is by and large sensitive to the same contextual factors as presup-
positions. we propose to treat presuppositions and conventional implicatures as
one general class as further possible subdivisions based on other criteria are not
relevant to the issue of veridicity.
4 Some Examples relevant for Information Extraction
As can be understood from what precedes, conventional implicatures are impor-
tant for veridicity judgments: they represent author commitments except in the
contexts discussed in the previous sections. In what follows we will give some
examples that illustrate their importance for the understanding and attribution
of that-complements
4.1 Factive and non-factive that-complements
In sentences such as (11) the author relates a source to a statement.
(11) Bush said that Iraq had aided al Qaida.
The choice of the verb indicates the relationship, or lack thereof, between
the source and the statement but it also indicates the stance of the author with
respect to the truth of the statement. In example (11), the author attributes the
statement Iraq has aided al Qaida to Bush and does not take a stance with regard
to to its truth. In example (12), the author attributes the statement Iraq has
not aided al Qaida to the source without taking a stance. In (13), however, the
author indicates that she is in agreement with the source about the statement.
(12) Bush denied that Iraq had aided al Qaida.
(13) Bush acknowledged that Iraq had aided al Qaida.
Verbs that indicate that the author and the source are in agreement are
called ‘factive’ [10]. Some examples are acknowledge, avow, admit, concede, con-
fess, regret, ... whereas non-factives are, e.g. deny, claim, say, announce, report,
suggest, ...
5 If the author believes that Gonzales has exactly two previous convictions, in the
second sentence of (10), Gonzales could be referred to as the two-time offender (his
present status) or as the three-time offender (his status, if convicted again).
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Factives conventionally implicate that the author is committed to the truth
of the statement made in the complement clause. As explained in the previous
section, this entails that the negation of a factive means that the author remains
committed to the truth of the statement although, of course, it signals that the
source itself is not committed to the statement. This is illustrated in (14)
(14) The spokesman did not acknowledge that Bush had been mistaken.
Observations similar to those made about verbs of saying can be made with
regard to to cognitive verbs such as believe, realize, .... Here we can say that
the verb establishes a relation between a proposition, an experiencer, who can
be considered to be a type of source, and the author. As with verbs of saying,
the choice of the verb indicates the stance of the author with respect to the
veridicity of the proposition. To give just one example
(15) a. Bush realized that the US Army had to be transformed to meet new
threats.
b. Bush didn’t realize that Afghanistan is land-locked.
Other factives of this type are discover, find out, forget, know, learn, recog-
nize, foresee, notice, ..., whereas assume, believe, think, suspect, imagine, hope,
... are non-factive.
The distinction between factives and non-factives is not only relevant for
verbs that indicate a relation between sources, propositions or statements and
authors. Sometimes the author expresses her stance vis-a`-vis a proposition with-
out there being a source mentioned. We list here some of these expressions. The
expressions in (16) contrast with those in (17).
(16) a. It does/doesn’t matter to me that Kerry lost.
make sense, suffice, bother, amuse, irritate, ...
b. It is/isn’t amazing that Bush won.
unfortunate, known, sad, good, great, lucky, important, ...
c. It is/isn’t an accident that Rumsfeld was not informed.
coincidence, disaster, miracle, blessing, ...
(17) a. It is unlikely that Ossama has been captured.
likely, probable, possible, ...
b. There is a rumor that the U.S. will invade Syria.
claim, rumor, belief, suspicion, hypothesis, idea, ..
Again when the factive predicates in (16) are negated, the author’s commit-
ment remains.
4.2 author commitments in that-complements
When the source differs from the author, the linguistic construction does not
always clearly indicate which statements are to be attributed to the source and
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which ones to the author. For instance, in the following example, the source
could have made the statement The US has invaded Iraq again or the statement
The US has invaded Iraq with again as a contribution of the author. In this case
we have an ambiguity.
(18) CNN announced that the US has invaded Iraq again.
In section 3 we discussed several syntactic constructions that lead to con-
ventional implicatures. As discussed above, the multi-dimensional treatment
that Karttunen and Peters and Potts give to these sentences, separates the
true assertion from the conventional implicatures. When they are part of that-
complements, the conventional implicatures remain part of the author’s commit-
ment. We illustrate this here with a couple of examples.
(19) a. CNN just announced that Ames, who stole from the CIA, is now behind
bars.
b. Bill denied that Lance Armstrong, an Arkansan, has won the 2002 Tour
de France.
As it happens the proposition Ames stole from the CIA is true whereas Lance
Armstrong is an Arkansan is false. But in both cases we are justified in conclud-
ing that the author is committed to the conventional implicatures.
5 Conclusions: Truth, Author Commitment and
Information Extraction
For purposes of IE, it is reasonable to consider as veridical both the assertions
of the author and the conventional implicatures she is committed to, except
when they occur in the contexts discussed in sections 3 and 2. In the previ-
ous section we gave some examples of how conventional implicatures interact
with author commitment. This discussion is far from complete but we hope it
makes clear that to assess the veridicity of what is reported in a text one has to
take into account what is asserted and what is conventionally implicated. Based
on that distinction one can start to calculate the author’s commitment to the
truth of what is reported. The examples in subsection 4.1 show that the way a
that-complement is introduced plays an important role in this calculation. We
have limited our examples to that type of complement but, as show in section
2, infinitival complements lead to similar distinctions. In fact, not only verbal
complements are important but also unfortunately understudied adverbial ex-
pressions, such as according to x.
As the examples of supplemental expressions show, it is not enough to look
at the matrix verb to evaluate the contribution of the that-complement. Some
syntactic constructions signal that embedded material is part of the author’s
commitment and can thus be considered veridical in most circumstances.
Whether ultimately one considers any of the veridical propositions as true
will then of course depend on the trustworthiness of the author but as we said in
the introduction that is something that cannot be determined on purely linguistic
grounds.
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